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I. Introduction;' 
~eliable estimates of the rate of net internal migration to urban 
areas in Zaire are difficult to obtain, particularly for recent time periods. 
Baute has made estimates of rates of urban population growth for the 1959-
70 period, of which the net in-migration rate is an important component 
[1 ]. However, there is evidence that even these estimates of the total 
growth rate are subject to large errors since they are based on a compar­
ison of administrative censuses, which have shown a marked tendency toward 
. h. i b. 1 .underenumeration in. ot er countr es. l Such a 1as seems to b e ess serious 
in the 1970 census due to less fear of intimidation, taxation, or forced 
labor than it was in the 1959 census, so that any urban growth rate 
calculated from these census results may well be an overestimate of the 
actual rate. 
In addition, to obtain estimates of net in-migration from urhan 
growth rates would require information on urban rates of natural increase 
and net rates of immigration from abroad to urban areas. According to the 
1970 administrative census [15), such immigration was negligible, but at 
2least one other source indicates the contrary. Althougi estimates of 
age-specific fertility and mortality have been made by Romaniuk Q7] for 
both urban and rural areas for the 1955-57 period, these rates may not 
be apµlicable to a later time period. Applying Romaniuk's age-specific 
rates to the total numher of persons by sex and age obtained in the 1955-57 
demographic inquiry, which appears to .be a better base estimate than the 
1959 administrative census, an estimate of the 1970 population was obtained 
which fell substantially below (i.e., by over 10 percent) the adjusted 
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estimate obtained from the 1970 administrative census. The latter, 19.7 
million persons, represents a correction by Boute for inflated populations 
in two provinces. Hence, it might well be concluded that age-specific 
fertility rose and/or age-specific mortality fell during the period from 
1955-57 to 1970, making Romaniuk's vital rate estimates inapplicable in 
any computation of net in-migration. Support for this conjecture in the 
urban context is provided by the 1967 socio-demographic survey of Kinshasa, 
which indicates substantial increases in age-specific fertility when 
compared with the 1955 inquiry [14]. 
This is not to say that. rates of net in-migration to urban areas 
have been insignificant during the post-Independence period. Even though 
intercensal comparisons require arbitrary assumptions and are otherwise 
subject to significant errors, socio-demographic surveys of individual 
cities suggest high rates of net in-migration. In Kinshasa, the capital 
city, for example, this rate has been estimated at about 6 percent per 
annum between 1955 and 1967, on the basis of the 1967 socio-demographic 
survey. 
There are a variety of approaches to try to explain rural-urban 
migration rates in less developed countries. One method is to explain 
the rate of increase in a given socio-economic group due to net migration 
between two points on the basis of income and other variables at the 
destination relative to those at the source. Another approach, which we 
adopt in this paper, is to examine determinants of a major variable, rural 
employment, in which changes are inversely associated with the net rural­
urban migration rate. Where there are significant errors in variables 
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amplified by calculating rates of change, this approach may well have 
advantages over the flow determination approach. Hore specifically, it 
may provide a means of obtaining more satistically efficient estimates of 
the qualitative association between certain socio-economic or geographic 
variables and the decision to migrate, than would be the case if a crude 
estimate of net flows were the dependent variable. 
In this paper we analyze variables which may be expected to have 
opposite qualitative effects on rates of rural-urban migration and rural 
employment density. These variables include factors influencing the 
terms of trade faced by farmers such as the monopsony power of individual 
buyers, and the cost and availability of transport. They also include 
factors influencing the real opportunity wage in nearby cities such as 
money wages and commodity prices. A once and for all change in these 
variables will in a static model with no population growth alter agricultural 
employment permanently and bring about a short-run, though significant, 
deviation in the rural-urban migration rate from a stationary equilibrium. 
In Part II a simple partial equilibrium model relating agricultural 
employment to transport cost and market structure will be presented. Part 
III outlines the empirical procedure used and tests some of the main 
relationships derived from the model, based on micro cross-section data 
from the 1970 agricultural census of Zaire. The last section will sunnnarize 
the policy implications of our analysis. 
.. 
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II. Analytic Framework 
In this paper we consider, in addition to the usual "pull" factors 
such as the real urban wage rate, two other sets of variables, which affect 
rural employment change and the rural-urhan migration rate through the 
individual farmer's terms of trade. The first is transport cost between 
the point where the agricultural good is produced and the point of its 
final destination; the second is monopsony power, i.e., the capacity of 
an individual buyer bywithholding demand, to reduce the price of the 
agricultural good which the farmer offers. Such power may arise because 
the buyer represents a company which is imperfectly competitive in the 
final product market for the raw agricultural good being purchased. It 
may also arise in spite of a high degree of competition among processing 
companies, simply due to a shortage of middlemen in the local agricultural 
area. 
Let us begin first by examining the~ priori effect of transport 
cost change on agricultural employment variation and the rate of rural­
urban migration. 
Transport cost 
Consider a very simple model in wl1ich there are only two factors 
of production, land and labor, and one crop, say manioc. Assume there is 
only one urban center and that part of the manioc is consumed hy the 
farmer and part exported to the urban center in exchani<e for manufactured 
goods (H-goods), which are all imported from ah road. Land and labor are 
assumed to be the only inputs into farr.dng and labor the only input into 
transporting. 
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The real wage in each location is assumed to be made up of both 
M-goods and manioc. All workers are assumed to have identical tastes 
and the real wage may be a single bundle of goods or an indifference 
curve composed of equally acceptable bundles. In all locations, there is 
an infinitely elastic supply of labor at a certain specified real wage 
as a consequence of unemploymeQt in urban areas. 
Suppose that an infinitely elastic supply of both H-goods and manioc 
is available in the urban area at a fixed price (determined in world markets) 
under perfect competition; then the terms of trade for individual farms 
located outside the urban area will differ from this world terms of trade. 
The higher the cost of transporting goods from the farm to the urban area, 
the more we would expect the selling price of manioc at the farm to fall 
below the world price. By the same token, the higher the cost of hack­
haulage, the more we would expect the cost of M-goods in the farming area 
to exceed their world price. Thus, the higher the cost of transport, the 
higher will be the price of M-goods relative to manioc at the farm. 
Because of this difference in the terms of trade due to variation 
in transport cost, different farms will have different costs of labor 
(explicit or implicit) in terms of manioc. Wage rates expressed in terms 
of manioc are measured along the vertical axes in Figures 1 and 2, taken 
frbm Pease' s analysis [11]. The slopes of the budget lines in these dia­
grams are equal to -P, where Pis the ratio of the price of M-goods to 
the price of manioc. In Figure 1, it is shown that, when this slope is 
steeper due to higher transport costs, a higher real wage (expressed in 
terms of manioc) must be offered in order for the laborer to consume the 
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same real wage bundle. The same is true even when the budget lines need 
only be tangent to the same indifference curve rather than intersect at 
the same point as shown in Figure 2. In both these diagrams, w re­2 
presents the cost of labor on a farm with relatively high transport costs 
and w the cost of labor on a farm with relatively low transport costs.1 
Let us assume that the expected real wage rate in the city (expressed 
in terms of manioc), w0 , is equivalent in utility terms tc t:!2 real 
wage rates on the farms, so that the budget line for the urban wage is 
either tangent to the same indifference curve or intersects the other 
budget lines at the same point. Then, under the standard Harris-Todaro 
assumption [6], there will be no incentive to migrate provided the average 
product of labor on a family farm exceeds the equivalent in utility of the 
expected real wage bundle in the urban area. In fact, given the strong 
tendency for extended families to share in Zaire, urban relatives may he 
allowed to remigrate to the family farm under these conditions. Since the 
region associated with a specified total transport cost is finite, agricul­
tural employment in a given region will be determined by the condition 
that the average product of labor be equal in utility terms to the expected 
urban opportunity wage, i.e., the expected utility of the real· income that 
an adult would receive were he to move to the city. The higher the 
transport cost associated with the farming area, the higher the relative 
price of the M-goods relative to manioc. This implies that the average 
product of labor (equal in utility terms to the urban opportunity wage) 
must also be higher in this area and, other things being equal, employment 











~ Locus of Equally Acceptable 
Real Wage Bundles 
M-Goods 
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This inverce association between transport cost and intensity of 
cultivation also exists in the case where hired labor is employed on farm:;. 
In this case, the profit-maximi:dng farmer will hire lahor up to the point 
where the marginal rather than average product of labor is equal to the cost 
of lahor in a given region. This cost is once again determined hy an 
equilibrium condition which equates utility obtained from lahor in rural 
with the expected utility gained from labor in urban areas. Aside from 
the fact that the land-labor ratio tends to be higher in hired labor agri­
culture than on a family farm and rental returns must be assigned to land­
owners, the qualitative relationship between agricultural employment and 
transport cost remains the same. The higher the transport cost, the 
higher will be equilibrium marginal product of labor and the lower will 
be employment per unit of land given diminishing returns. 
If, in some region, there is a maximum marginal or average value 
product of labor at a given net price of manioc and the cost of labor 
determined hy the urban opportunity wage exceeds this maximum, land there 
will not be cultivated. Note that a region may lie uncultivated even if 
there is no limit to the marginal or average product of labor in that 
region. If the import costs are so high that the cost of transporting a 
unit of manioc to the urban area exceeds its value in the urhan area, then 
it is impossible to purchase }1-goods with that region's budget. Workers 
who demand some ~1-goods as part of their real wage hundle will be unwilling 
to work in such a region making cultivation of its land impossible. 
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Suppose that (a) all land in the economy were identical except 
for transport cost and (b) the cost of transporting manioc and M-goods 
were simply a function of the distance from the urban area; then the amount 
of farm labor, manioc output, and possibly rental return per unit of land 
would all decline as the distance from the urban area increased. If the 
economy were large enough, there would be a frontier of cultivation at 
which the value of land would be zero and heyond it no cultivation would 
take place. The fact that, in this sense, some land is too costly to 
cultivate, not that there is a "surplus" of land, may well account for the 
large areas of Zaire which remain totally uncultivated. 
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Monopsony 
The inverse association between agricultural employment and transport 
cost described above may be even stronger when monopolistic elements in the 
market for agricultural produce are allowed for. The marketing system in 
Zaire is a complicated one, with some parts of it ch?racterized by intensive 
competition, but other parts apparently monopolistic. The competitive ele­
ment that has been most frequently described occurs in the town market 
place, with market women selling side by side. The marketing element, how­
ever, which has been less well studied, but is more relevant to a discussion 
of the transport network, involves the role of the larger middlemen. There 
do not appear to be many middlemen who go from village to village buying 
produce. Truck costs are high even at the point of importation, and a good deal 
higher in the interior. Imperfect capital markets, then, restrict the number of 
truckers. In addition, the price of a given agricultural good may be artificially 
depressed not because of a shortage of self-employed middlemen but because the 
only middlemen are representatives of a processing firm (e.g. the cotton cartel) 
which is the sole producer or nearly sole producer of the final product derived 
from the raw agricultural good. 
Throughout Zaire, food crops are sold by individual family farmers to 
middlemen in exchange for M-goods. With a breakdown in the transport system 
in the post-Independence period, the after-cost price offered by these middle­
men for the crops they purchase has declined relative to the urban price for 
two reasons: (1) transport to urban areas is less frequently available, hence 
storage costs for middlemen have risen; (2) the direct cost of transport is 
higher per ton-mile when available. In addition, the middlemen are able to 
--I 
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some degree to decrease the price they pay for food crops by withholding 
demand. Such monopsony power exists because there are few middlemen rela­
tive to individual producers or limited competition among processors of the 
raw agricultural good. 
To maximize his or his company's profits n, the middleman must choose 
a price such that the following expression is maximized: 
(1.1) 
pwhere = urban price of the agricultural good (fixed)u 
pi = price paid by middler::an to seller at i 
= distance: i to marketdi 
t = per ton kilometer transport cost (including storage cost), 
assumed constn.nt 
= output of seller at iqi 
From this maximization process, we obtain the relationship 
P - d t 
u i(1.2) Pi == 1 + 1/ e. 
l 
where e is the elasticity of supply of the individual producer. Let1 
(1.3) 
Then we may write the expression for Pi as 
(1.4) 
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Provided the elasticity of supply ispositive but less than infinity, the coefficier 
B will be less than unity. Therefore, in this case of pure monopsony, 
the price received by the producer will be lower than in the case where 
there is no monopsony power and the producer's price is simply 
(1.5) P = P - dit •i u 
Though lower, the price of producers is less sensitive to transport cost 
changes with pure monopsony than with no monopsony at all. From (1.4), 
it is clear that a reduction (increase) in unit transport cost, t, will 
result in a less than proportional increase (decrzase) in the price received 
by the producers. Part of the reduction in unit transport cost, t, 
leads to a rise in the profits of the monopsonist while part of a rise 
in t comes out of his profits. Thus, with the number of buyers constant 
in a given region, monopsony reduces the sensitivity of agricultural employ­
ment to changes in transport cost, although it also implies a lower level 
of agricultural employment at a fixed level of transport cost. This result change~ 
with inter-regional mobility of buyers. A localized improvement_ in trans-
port can further increase in some regions the monopsony profits of truckers 
or the company they represent. Because of scarce capital, the truckers or 
the company can choose to purchase only in those areas where transport costs 
are relatively low and profits relatively high, leaving the more remote areas 
with fewer transport alternatives. In spite of the assumptions of the inter­
nationally determined terms of trade and the real wage, it is possible that a 
region not directly covered by transport investment can be harmed by the 
investment, and as a consequence have a higher rate of outmigration. Truckers 
will be induced into the region in which the investment takes place because of 
higher monopsony profits. 
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III. Empirical Tests 
The 1970 FAO agricultural census of Zaire[l3J provides a statistical 
base for testing some of the relationships between transport cost, monopsony 
power, the urban wage and the intensity of cultivation discussed in the pre­
vious section. This survey consisted of 20,000 agricultural units in the 
traditional sector, which were interviewed from March ,1970, to March ,1971. It 
comprised approximately 1/2 per cent of all units in the sector, and was 
selected randomly. 3 Our sample consists of a 10 per centrandom sample of this 
entire survey. 
We have investigated three main lines of argument, all of which relate 
the intensity of cultivation to the profitability of agricultural or urban 
employment. The first has to do with the cost of transport; the second with 
the effects of commercial middlemen and of monopolistic buyers of agricul­
tural produce; and the third with the alternative of urban employment. In 
each case, we can compare the response of women and men to these economic 
incentives. To the extent that the determinants of the intensity of cultiva­
tion differ by sex, rural-urban migration pattems by sex are also likely to 
differ. As well, we compare the response on those farms that produce for 
market with those that' do not. 
Our first hypothesis predicts that transport costs per commodity unit are 
negatively associated with employment per unit of cultivated land and positively 
associated with physical output per employed person in agriculture. The higher 
the transport cost to the nearest market, the less favorable will be the terms 
of trade which the farm faces and the greater will have to be the physical 
return to labor to compensate for rural-urban price differences. 
Direct estimates of transport cost cannot be made. Moreover, even if 
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conventional source-to-destination estimates of haulage cost could be ob­
tained, these would not adequately represent the full cost of transport as 
reflected in the real income of the individual farming unit. There is a 
great deal of transp·ort cost which is absorbed by the individual producing 
unit. If, for example, farmers must transport their produce to roads or 
river ports where trucks or boats come only infrequently, there may well be 
substantial time lost in household activities and deterioration of produce 
prior to its being sold to the shipper. These costs are not incurred by the 
ship operator or trucker in hauling the good. For these reasons, we utilize 
proxy variables for total transport cost per physical unit of the good. 
One proxy for total transport cost (including that which must be imputed 
to the individual farming unit) is distance. We expect the distance a farm 
lies off a single straight road leading to an urban area to rise, the farther 
a given point the road from the urhan area. From this it followson is th.c1t 
transport cost increases more than proportionately with distance, as access 
roads and frequency of trucks decline, and as storage and deterioration costs rise. 
Transport costs, however, are not adequately represented by the 
distance to the nearest market. For this reason, we have also included 
a number of dummy variables reflecting the type of transport used by the 
farmer to carry his produce to the nearest mark.et. These variahles, however. 
have certain important defects. For one thing, some of the transport 
costs are borne directly by the farmer, while others are borne by the 
middleman and reflected in the price of marketed surplus. For another, 
the method of transporting agricultural produce to the first location of 
sale might obscure subsequent transactions and the cost of reaching the 
final destination. A unit may use a very primitive form of trans-
15 
port s~ch as the b~ck of a ~an to get his product to market, and yet the 
market may be located next to a railroad track or a river. In this case, 
a relatively sophisticated transport mode would be used across most of the 
distance to the final destination. In many instances, farmers situated in 
the more remote areas would not transport the goods to market themselves, 
but rather wait for middlemen to approach, in which case no mode of trans­
port would be specified on the questionnaire. On balance, however, we would 
expect employment per unit of cultivated land to be higher on farms using 
more advanced transport than the back of man or a push cart. 
Our second major hypothesis suggests that monopsony power either by 
middlemen or by agricultural processors should lower the price received by 
the farmer, decreasing the intensity of cultivation. We have measured the 
effect of monopsony in two ways. The first method uses a dummy variable for 
those farms that sell to a monopolist in the final product market and can be 
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interpreted as part of the long run terms of trade. The second uses the 
terms of trade at the time of the produce sale, as measured by the relative 
price of manufactured goods plus transport cost to the average price of 
marketed surplus. To the extent that monopsonistic middlemen do not represent 
monopolists in the processed goods market, this "short run" terms of trade 
should, but the dummy variable should not, be significant. 
Finally, we test our third hypothesis--that a higher real urban 
wage is inversely related to the intensity of cultivation--by using both 
an urban wage in terms of manioc and the relative price of manufactured 
goods to manioc in the city. Ideally, we would include the effect of 
ur}ian unemployment. Accurate estimates, however, of the urban employment 
rate are available for only one city, Kinshasa, and even here it is question­
able whether this is a complete indicator of employment opportunities [12] · 
Whether the data comes from the agricultural census or from other sources, 
a number of the variables we are using might be subject to extreme errors in measure 
ment. For example, the survey units were asked the number of weeks each member 
worked between visits. It is highly unlikely that the respondents could 
give accurate retrospective estimates of weeks worked particularly over a 
time period as .long as 3 or 4 months. On the other hand, a variable such as 
the average number of persons per visit would be subject to considerably less 
bias. And, although there is some problem in estimating age, a more accurate 
measure of employment than weeks worked may be simply the number of persons 
15-64 years of age, which is also provided in the survey. Farm size is among 
the other variables subject to considerable measurement error; In 
addition, the correct interpretation of the transport mode dummies, listed in 
Table 1, cannot be verified. 
Unfortunately, a number of the variables we need cannot be obtained from 
the available data. Only in nine cities is it possible to estimate a manufactured 
good's price. Since budget studies do not exist even in these cities, we must 
confine ourselves to making a comparison of individual agricultural and manu­
factured goods prices rather than comparing price indices. We chose simply 
a ratio of the price of a frequently used clothing item to the price of a 
frequently used food item. Wage rate data are available for only twenty-one cities. 
Distance is estimated by the number of kilometers from an administrative 




Transport and Narket Structure Variahles 
T
1 
Unit uses "back of man" to take marketed surplus to first location 
of sale 
T2 Unit us
es "beast of burden" to take marketed surplus to first 
location of sale 
T
3 
Unit uses "cart" to take marketed surplus to first location of sale 
T
4 
Unit uses "bicycle" to take marketed surplus to first location of 
sale 
T5 
Unit uses "truck" to take marketed surplus to first location of sale 
T
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Unit uses "other" to take marketed surplus to first location of sale 
v
1 
Unit is part of a commercial or industrial enterprise 
v
2 
Unit delivers part or all of its produce to an agricultural industry 
v
3 
llnit delivers its produce to a monopoly 
V
4 
Unit's produce buyer takes an interest in the unit's management 
To sum up, in our regression equations we can use as explanatory 
variables distance, dummies for the mode of transport, dummies for market 
structure, the short run terms of trade, the real urban wage rate and a 
proxy for the relative price of the manufactured good. We also included 
farm area, as an important determinant of intensity of cultivation. Most 
cultivated area in Zaire is communally allocated among different households 
by the tribe. Wage labor is rare. We expect, then, the farm area variable 
to be inversely related to intensity of cultivation. Those areas which tend 
to have higher land allotments per adult, such as in the savannah or where 
soil quality is low, should be associated with lower intensity of cultivation. 
We compared the role of men to that of women in Zaire agriculture 
by considering three different dependent variables: total persons. 15-64 
per hectare; males 15-64 per hectare; and females 15-64 per hectare. 
These variables are essentially labor force rather than employment measures, 
but are reasonable proxies for the latter. This breakdm-m by sex is espe­
cially important considering the descriptions in much of the anthropological 
literature. 
The system of shifting cultiva~ion, which characterizes traditional 
agriculture in Zaire, involves farming an individual plot only temporarily 
until its natural fertility declines. At that time, the farming household 
puts a new plot of land under cultivation, and abandons the old one. Each 
year there is some clearing of forest and underbrush so that new plots can 
be put under cultivation. Although there are major tribal exceptions, these tasks 
are generally said to be reserved for men. On the other hand, most of the planting, 
maintenance, and harvesting tasks are performed by women. Thus, although 
the work of men prevents a 
long-run fall in crop yields, nearly all tasks vital to short-run production 
in agriculture seem to be performed by women. In fact, most studies indicate 
that the hours put in by men in agriculture fall substantially short of those 
put in by women. 
Since functions performed by the two sexes differ significantly, an 
attempt should be made to explain male and female employment separately, as 
well as total employment [9]. Rates of migration, by implication, will also 
differ. It may be argued that some of the independent variables of our 
equations have a significant effect on male employment but not on female, 
and vice versa. The real wage rate in the nearest city (expressed in terms 
of agricultural goods), for instance, may well be negatively associated with 
male but not female employment in a given agricultural region. Women are not 
generally formally employed in urban areas, and hence,the real opportunity 
wage rate in a proximate urban area is not an indication of the opportunity 
cost of their remaining in agriculture. Since work involving machinery tends 
to be limited to men, we would expect the mechanical transport mode dummies to have 
a greater positive association with male than they do with female employment. 
We have also divided the production units into groups that market some 
5produce during the time period covered by the survey and those that do not. 
Again, we would expect the two groups to respond differently to production 
and migration incentives. Production on a farm which is outside the market 
economy might not react strongly to a deterioration in the terms of trade. 
On the other hand, family members can still migrate in hopes of obtaining the 
urban wage. In fact, migration might be the only possible way to improve 
income, if the unit is unable to sell produce. 
The first equation estimated took the form 
4 72(2.4) E. b0 + b1wJ.m + b2q. + b3d.. + b H. + I b4+kVk. + I b 8 kTk.lill 4Jm lJm 1m k=l 1m k=l + im 
where E. is employment (male, female, or total) per hectare on al farm unit i; 
w. 
J 
is the real wage expressed in terms of food in city j; q. is the price of 
J 
manufactured goods relative to the price of food in city j; d .. is the
lJ 
average distance between farm unit i and city j; H. is the average hee­
l 
tares per farm unit; Vki are dummies for market structure; and Tki are dummies 
for transport mode. In each case, m defines whether the farm produces for the 
market or not. The hypothesized sign of the coefficient for thew. variable 
J 




negative. One would expect the coefficients for the more primitive 
transport modes to be smaller than the less primitive, and one would expect 
the coefficients for the second and third market structure variables to. be 
2negative, but ambiguous for the first and fourth. If d .. is a proxy for
lJ 
the cost of shipping goods, we would expect its coefficient to be negative. 
The equations for total, male and female employment per cultivated 
hectare were fitted to data for 1313 farms with marketed surplus and 724 
without (a lOper eent random sample of the original survey). The independent 
variable coefficients for equations based on farms with marketed surplus, 
together with the coefficients of determination, are presented in Table 2. 
The equations based on data from farms that did not sell for the market are 
not reproduced at this stage, but only later with a better specification of 
the model. The coefficients of determination are very high for cross-section 
data, and the F ratios are well above the 1 percent critical value. 
In every equation predicting employment per hectare, at least four 
Table 2 
Employment per Cultivated Hectare of Units with Marketed Surplus 
a 
Independent Total Adults (15-64) / Total Males (15-64)/ Total females (15-f
Variables hectare hectare hectare
Farm area -.007 (11.533)*** -.004 (11.667)*** -.003 (10. 088) *** 
b Wage ./P(food). .452 (1. 641) .094 (.613) .358 (2.248)*J J 
C P(mfg)./P(food). -.084 (1.322) -.042 (1.174) -.042 (1.154)J J 
d 
·Distance squared -.L, o"'"4 (2.500)** -3xl0-5 (1. 500) -7xl0-5 (3.500)*** 
Back transport .944 (.373) .385 (.272) .560 (.383) 
Truck transport 32. 309 (3.579)*** 19.197 (3. 804) *** 13.112 (2.515)** 
e 
Other transport 24.549 (2.332)** 16.058 (2. 729)** 8.491 (1. 397) 
f 
Sell to monopolist -6.427 (2.573)** -2. 713 (1. 943) -3. 714 (2.574)** 
Intercept 45.255 22.198 23.056 
R2 .113 .091 .092 
F(DF=8,1304) 20.684*** 16.312*** 16. 4 ]Lt*''' 
aThe t-ratios are in parentheses. One asterisk(*) means that the coefficient
is significantly non-zero at the five per cent level using a two-tailed test,
two asterisks (**) represent a one per cent level, and three(***) asterisks
represent a .001 level. 
b 
Salary data for twenty-one cities taken from Kazadi wa Dile, Politiques Salariales/ .,,, ,,... ---------------·-_et Developpement_~~-~ub:\:_iq~e Democratique du Congo, Reche~ches Afri cai.nes XV
(Paris: Editons Universitaires and Institut de Recherches Economioues et
Sociales, Universite Lovanium de Kinshasa, 1970), Annexe T. Price of food is the
p·rice of manioc in the zone nearest the city as estimated by the Institut Nationale
de la Statistique. 
cMfg. price= price of clothing in nine cities. 
dThe distance variable gives the number of km's from the zone centers to the
nearest of twenty-one cities for which we had salary data. 
Notes continued on next page. 
Notes to Table 2 
e,,O h " t er transport refers mainly to river transport. 
f
We originally had three monopoly type variables, of which the second was 
statistically most significant: 
(i) Does the unit deliver part of all of its produce to an agricultural 
industry? 
(ii) Is the enterprise to which produce is delivered a monopoly? 
(iii) Does the enterprise to which produce is delivered take an interest 
in the unit's management? 
n 
variables are significantly non-zero near the five per cent level when a 
two-tailed test is used and many are highly significant. The most startling 
among these is the average farm size variable.While the coefficient has the 
predicted sign, its significance is probably partly due to measurement error. 
Hectarage appears both on the right hand side of the equation and in the 
denominator of the dependent variable. Therefore, any error in measurement 
creates a negative bias in the coefficient. The distance variable has the 
hypothesized sign and is significant for adults and women, and near the five per 
cent level of signifi~ance using a one-tailed test for men. Of the trans-
port mode variables, preliminary tests showed that only three had coefficients 
. 6at least as large as their standard errors in absolute magnitude, and henc~ 
these alone were included in the regression equations presented in Table 2. 
Still, the relative magnitude of the coefficients is in line with our 
hypothesis. The coefficients for the more advanced transport modes, "truck" 
and "other," are greater than that for the "back of man" mode. Moreover, 
the coefficients for "truck" and "other" are for the most part statistically 
significant. Only one of the market structure variables--the proportion of 
units selling their produce to a monopolistic enterprise--has a coefficient 
greater than its standard error. It was always of the hypothesized sign and 
both more significant and stronger for women than for men • 
. The urban real wage and the relative urban prices are neither-of the 
predicted sign, nor significant. It is possible that those farms which are 
able to market a surplus are located in relatively fertile areas. The 
direction of causation might run from relatively productive cultivation to 
relatively high population density, high opportunity cost of labor and 
a high urban wage. For the farms which did not produce a marketed surplus, 
the opposite and expected sign for the real urban wage was obtained. In 
this case, it is likely that the urban wage ,acted to pull labor into the 
city, rather than in response to agricultural productivity. 
To go into more detail, it is useful to contrast the male and female 
equations. The independent variables explain slightly less of the total 
variations in male and female employment per hectare than they do in the 
case of total adult population. As hypothesized, the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the coefficients vary between the two sexes. 
First of all, those transport variables whicl1 ';,;'E Kould expect to be more 
important for men than for women have both larger and more significant 
coefficients for men. The t-ratios and coefficients for "truck" and "other" 
transport are higher, whereas those for "back of man" are lower in the equa-
tion 2xplaining male employment. This is quite consistent with wonen 
transporting produce primarily by back, rather than by truck. 
Again, as predicted, whether or not a farm sells to a monopolist has a 
greater and more significant impact.on women, who supposedly do more of the agri­
cultural work than do men. If we are correct in interpreting the real urban ware 
as a proxy for soil fertility, we obtain as expected, a more significant association 
between the urhan wage rate and female emplovrnent than between the urban wage 
rate and male emnlovment. This is consistent with the view that women have a 
great deal of earning abilitv in rural areas. Rv contrast, men will migrate to 
the citv in response to a smaller change in the expected real wage than will women, 
with little effect on agricultural emplovment. 
Similarlv, distance from market has a larger and more significant impact 
on female employment than male. This relationship is perfectlv consistent 
with our interpretation of distance as one component of the long-run terms 
of trade. It could also, however, be indirect evidence of the monopsony 
model presented in Section II. In that case, distance will affect employ­
ment through its association with transport cost by affecting the number 
of monopsonists. Thus we would expect a much larger number of buyers close 
to the city where monopsony profits are relatively high than far away from 
the city where monopsony profits are relatively low. This implies that 
total transport cost per physical unit measured by distance will have a 
negative impact on agricultural employment independent of any effect on the 
terms of trade. 
One way of testing for this is to include the terms of trade in the 
regression equation, along with a separate distance variable. One possible 
specification is derived as follows. Suppose that price P(M). of a given
l 
manufactured good on farm i imported from region j is given by P(M). ~ P(M) .+td .. 
l J l] 
where P(M).
] 
is the price of the manufactured good in city j, d .. is the dis-
l] 
tance between i and j, and t the transport cost per kilogram-kilometer. 
It is assumed that the general employment per cultivated hectare equa­
tion takes the form 
E. 
lm 
where C is a row vector of coefficients; V' is a column vector of transport-
mode and market-structure variables; and P(A). is the average price of marketed
l 
surplus received by the unit i. All the other variables are as before. When 
the equation determining P(M). is substituted into this equation we have
l 
JJ4td.. 2
E. = µO + µ H. + µ
2w. + µ q. + µ P(M). /P(A). 
+ l]ID + d + C·V'
lill 1 1m J m 3 J m 4 J m 1m P(A). µ5 ..lill l]ill m 







The results of estimating tl,is equation for total, male" and female 
adult population are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
A comparison of these tables corroborates our previous findings, 
hut also provides new insight into the interpretation of cost and avail­
ahil itv of transport. First, a summary of the conclusions that carry 
over from the earlier discussion. The long- run terms of trade measured 
by distance and the monopoly dummy continue to be more significant for 
women tt1an for men. Horeover, as one would expect, these terms of trade 
are consi<lerahly more important for farms that market a surplus than for 
those that have a potential hut no actual surplus. The short-run terms 
of trade, however, are generally not significant. This weak effect could 
he due to one of several difficulties. For one thing, the price data 
is suhject to short-run random fluctuations which do not influence employ­
ment and production decisions in the house110ld. For anot 1wr, as we. 
ar~ued ahove, the costs borne by the farmer are not fully measured ½y the 
prices paid or received. The various transport mode dummies are an 
















Sell to monopolist 
Intercept 
R2 
F(DF = 10,1302) 
Table 3 
Farms with Marketed Surplus: 
a




-.007 (11.583)*** -.004 (10. 667)*** 
.179 (.514) -.074 (.382) 
.028 (.261) .028 (. 46 7) 
-.020 (1. 292) -.012 (1. 455) 
-41000 5.5x10 (. 809) 2.6x10
-4 (.684) 
-1. 3x10-4 (2.167)* -4x10
-5 (1. 333) 
.816 (.320) .346 (.243) 
32.330 (3.546)*** 19.429. (3.812)*** 
24.656 (2. 337) ** 16.242 (2.575)** 
-6.596 (2.613)** -2.764 (1. 960)* 
46.291 22. 961 
.114 .093 










.469 (. 319) 
12.901 (2.449)-; 





aThe t-ratios are in parentheses. One asterisk(*) means that the coefficient 
is significantly non-zero at the five per cent level using a two-tailed test, 
two asterisks (**) represent a one per centlevel, and three (***) asterisks 
represent a .001 level. 
bP(a).
]. 
is a weighted average of local crop prices, using local marketed surplus 
weights. 
.. 
Farms with ~-Jo :fark.ete<l Surplus: 
Distance and Terms of Trade Effectsa 
Dependent Variables 
Independent Adults/ ---- MalesF ·--- - --- Females/ 
_V_a_r_i_a_b_l_e_s_______--"-h=-=e=-=c=-=t=--=a=--=r~e,~------~h=-=e::..:c::..:t:..:a:.:r:..:e:.....___ hectare 
Farm area -.029 (12.973)*** -.014 (11.950)**~*----.0-15 (1n:~~-)_*_*_* 
Wage/P(food). -.986 (1. 922) -.572 (2.073)* -.414
J J 
P(mfg)./P(food). .280 (1. 694) .156 (l. 757) .124 (1. 7.2 7)
J J 
b 
P(mfg.)j/P(a)i -.052 (2.120)* -. 034 (2.542)** -.018 (l.237i 
b Distance/P(a).X(lOOO) 
]. 
.001 (.579) .'101 (1.14H) -.000 ( .071) 
Distance squared -.000 (1. 500) -.000 (1.600) -.000 (1. 333) 
~ack transport 5.237 (1. 406) • 788 (.394) 4.449 (1.956) 
G.rruck transport 20.131 (1. 022) 17.910 (1.691) 2.221 ( .18.5) 
'Dther transport 21.058 (1. 300) 20.053 (2.303)* 1.004 ( .102) 
%ell to monopolist -1. q35 (.368) • 477 (.lfi9) -2.412 (.752) 
Intercept 79.934 39.303 39.631 
• 206 .181 .156 
F(DF=lO, 713) 18.446*** 15. 777*** 13.221*** 
aThe t-ratios ar'e in parentheses. One asterisk (*) means t!1at the coefficient 
is significantly non-zero at the five per cent level using a p:o-tailed test, 
two asterisks (**) represent a oneper cent level, and three ('~**) asterisks 
represent a .001 level. 
bP(a)i is a weighted average of local crop prices, using local marketed 
surplus weights. 
The transport would he used if the unit had marketed surplus c-ven though 
it currently does not. 
dUnit would sell part of its marketed surplus to a monopolist if it had any. 
C 
If we consider Table tf, showing the results for farms without 
market sales, we observe that hoth "truck." and "other" transport are 
significantly more important for m~n than for women. It seems reason­
able to interpret this finding as an indicator of migration routes 
rather than as a proxy for the cost of transporting produce. These farms, 
after all, are not marketing a surplus. It is very likely that men 
migrating to urban areas congregate at ports and railway stops, where 
there is cheap and easy transport. Women, however, respond less to the 
availability of long distance modes of transport. In Table 3, where 
transportation facilities can represent both the migration network and 
the cost of shipping goods, we expect and find a large incn~ase in the 
importance of "truck" and "other" transport modes for women, and a much 
smaller change in their impact on men. This again is consistent with 
women's role in agriculture. 
A second indication that commercialized and non-commercialized 
farmers behave differently, is shown by the effect of tl-ie urban real 
wage. The non-commercialized farmers, who are not increasing their real 
income through trade, are more likely to migrate in response to urban 
salaries. This is true for both men and women, though the relation is 
stronger for men. In fact, the wage variables are insignificant in 
Table 3, partly because fertile areas with more commerctalized farms 
are likely to influence urban salaries, so that the direction of causality 
is. reversed. 
Finally, we have not been able adeauately to test the hypothesis 
that increasing transport costs and increasing distance, controlling for 
terms of trade, should increase monopsony power. To the extent that the 
transport mode variables are proxies for the terms of trade faced hy 
farmers with marketed surplus, the distance variable is a sign of increasing 
While this conclusion is speculative,monopsony with distance from the city. 
it has important policy implications. Suppose the total number of rural 
Then the improvement in transport infrastructuremiddlemen remains fixed. 
in a given region will be expected to increase employment in that region 
by attracting middlemen and decrease it in others by drawing them away. 
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IV. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined the qualitative relationship between 
the intensity of cultivation in rural areas on the one hand and a set of 
variables linked to monopsony power, transport cost, and earnings foregone 
as a result of not migrating to the city. For the most part, our empirical 
results based on straight cross-section data taken from the 1970 agricul­
tural census were consistent with the hypothesized qualitative relationships. 
However, any policy implicationsdrawn from these results regarding the 
effect of changes in certain variables on agricultural emplovment over 
time, let alone the rate of rural-urban migration, are subject to con­
siderable qualification. To begin with, it should be recognized that our 
model omits certain critical variables, in particular soil quality, in its 
explanation of the intensity of cultivation. In addition, distortion is 
created because a great many of the individuals in the data set have initiated 
but not completed a step-wise migration process. In other words, a model 
which assumes an equilibrium between rural and urban labor returns is being 
tested in a context in which a substantial disequilibrium may well exist. 
For example, there is a strong positive association between adult males per 
cultivated hectare and the availability of truck and river transport. Yet, 
the available evidence indicates that this is true not simplv because 
transport cost is relatively low and the terms of trade relatively favorable 
along roads or at river ports, but because moving to such places repre-
sents a logical first stop for a person migrating from the hinterland to 
an urban area. Hence, increasing the number of ports or roads may, contrary 
to our hypothesis, decrease rural employment in the long-run and significantlv 
increase the rural-urban migration rate in the short and intermediate term. 
32 
A number of rohust conclusions have, however, emer~ed from onr 
work. It seems to be unequivocally true that the cost of transport 
is inversely associated with the long-run number of adult women per 
cultivated hectare. Since this relationship is either positive or, if 
negative, substantially weaker in the case of males, we would expect in­
creases in the cost and decreases in the availability of transport to 
decrease the long-run ratio of adult women to adult men in agriculture. 
Under these conditions, we would expect a lower ratio of men to women 
outmigrants from the rural sector, even though the effect of changes in 
the availability and cost of transport on ti,e overall rate of migration 
remains ambiguous. This helps explain why tl-ie proportion of women in 
adult urban populations rose substantially he tween 1959 and 1970 [l, P • 817 J • 
During this period, there was a marked deterioration in the transport 
infrastructure and rising transport cost in rural areas f8], which may 
well have contributed to the altered pattern of sex-seled::ive migration. 
The qualitative effect of changes in monopsony power on long-run 
labor-ir:tensity in agriculture is much more .clearcut than that of transport 
cost or availability. If they sold their produce to a monopolistic proces­
sor, farms with positive marketed surplus, according to our results, had 
significantly lower numbers of total adults per cultivated hectare and 
women per cultivated hectare. The number of mP.n per cultivated hectare> 
was also lower if the farm with nositive marketed surnlus sold to a 
monopolistic processor, though not significantly so 1.)y conventional 
statistical stanc.En-,i·'.. Hence, our evidence indicates that increased 
competition in food processin~ voul<l incrPaSP intensity of ~1ltivation in 
agricultun, and decrease the short-run rate of outmigration from rural 
areas. 
FOOTNOTES 
*We are grateful to Eric R.Nelson for extensive comments and 
criticisms of an earlier draft and for correcting the data set. We would 
also like to thank William Duncan of the U.S. Bureau of the Census for 
his advice. The investigation was based on data provided by 
Citoven Mukendi, General Secretary of the Denartment of Agriculture, Re­
public of Zaire, and Nzeza zi Nkanga, Scientific Director, National 
Statistical Institute, Republic of Zaire. This research was financed by 
the U.S. Agency for International Development under contract CSD-2492. 
However, the views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect 
those of AID. 
1
The 1959 administrative census was part of a series of population 
registers used as a basis for taxation and forced labor during the period 
of Belgian control. Hence, there was a definite incentive to avoid being 
counted. Moreover, there is a tendency to map boundaries poorly in ad­
ministrative censuses. William Duncan of the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
has pointed out to us that experiments in Ghana have demonstrated that using 
administrative "village" listings as ppposed to full cartographic mapping 
can result in underenumeration of about 25 per cent. 
2There is evidence that innnigration had an important impact on 
population growth between 1959 and 1970 in Zaire. Even though the 1970 
administrative census lists only 938,000 foreign born, Hugh Brooks, 
et. al. in another source (13] indicate that during 1%6-67 alone 728,000 
refugees entered Zaire from neighboring countries. 
3
An agricultural unit is defined as a unit under a single direction 
and on which the same aids to production are used. Each of these units was 
visited three times during the census year by an interviewer. In addition, 
a final quick visit was made to all units hy the interviewers to complete 
certain data on the third questionnaire. 
4
other dummy variables representing different market structures are 
listed in Table 1. 
5
The farms producing for market are not easily distinguishable from 
those that do not. While they do have fewer household members per hectare 
(34 adults compared with 42), the difference is not significant. Nor 
are the differences between average terms of trade, distance from market, 
availability of transport etc. significant. Perhaps an omitted variable, 
such as soil fertility, is the crucial factor. 
6This is attributable to the fact that very few zones have a significant 
number of units using train or cart transport. Some of the units failed to 
report any transport mode. By far the most frequently used was the most 
primitive "back of man." 
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